



Economists have long recognized the need for durability-enhancing mechanisms to facilitate
political exchange, but the focus has been almost entirely on mechanisms that raise the cost
of reneging on bargains once they have been struck. What happens if these mechanisms
fail? This paper argues that politicians have an incentive to establish an insurance-like
mechanism that indemnifies interest groups whose legislatively-created benefits have been
reduced. I consider the role of the Department of Justice’s settlement authority in facilitat-
ing this type of transfer, and illustrate my argument by examining two recent settlements
involving Citigroup and Bank of America. These settlements are notable not only because
they involved the allocation of money to third-party groups who were not directly harmed by
the alleged violations of federal law, but because both corporations were required to donate
millions of dollars to housing counseling organizations whose subsidies Congress reduced
following the 2010 midterm elections.
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Transactions that are subject to ex post opportunism will benefit if appropriate safe-
guards can be devised ex ante.
- Oliver E. Williamson (1985, p. 48)
1 Introduction
When the Framers set out to design the system of checks and balances found in the United States’
constitution, they deliberately vested authority over the government’s finances with Congress.1
This power - known as the “power of the purse” - is supposed to be the primary means by
which Congress controls the administrative state. However, regulatory agencies have become
increasingly able to circumvent Congress’ appropriations power by raising and allocating rev-
enue without congressional approval, which is puzzling because much of the legal authority that
undergirds these agencies’ ability to self-finance Congress authorized.
The rise of agency finance is not a new phenomenon, although it has only been in the past
ten years that it has received attention from legal scholars. The analysis found in this literature
tends to be focused on what legal scholars view as the problems with agency finance - namely
the weakening of the separation of powers - rather than explaining its causes (Peterson, 2009;
Wilt, 2017). There are, of course, exceptions. DeMuth & Greve (2016), for example, speculate
that the rise of agency finance is part of a broader trend towards executive government, but fall
short of providing an economic theory of why this is the case.2
Why would Congress relinquish its control over agencies that could potentially impose sub-
stantial burdens on their constituents? In this paper, I argue that the answer lies in the peculiar
nature of political exchange. Like private transactions, political exchanges require assurance
that each party will live up to their end of the bargain. Unlike private transactions, however,
political exchanges lack legal sanctions to ensure compliance. The absence of such sanctions
1See Federalist No. 58 (1788).
2They acknowledge that “public-choice” factors - such as budget maximization á la Niskanen (2007) - have
likely contributed to this phenomenon, they brush these aside as being proximate rather than fundamental causes
of agency finance.
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creates uncertainty about the durability of the bargains between interest groups and the legis-
lature, thereby reducing the value of special interest legislation. If political exchange is to be
feasible, therefore, some mechanism, or set of mechanisms must exist to enforce agreements
between interest groups and politicians.
Landes & Posner (1975) were the first to draw attention to the durability problem inherent
to political transactions. They identified two types of institutional mechanisms that exist to
increase the durability of special-interest legislation. The first is the structure of the legislature
itself; majority-voting rules, the committee system, and bicameralism, for example, all increase
the cost of repealing legislation once its been passed.3 The second is the independent judiciary,
which, in their view, acts as a third-party enforcer of bargains struck between interest groups and
the legislature.4 Subsequent research along these lines identified an array of political institutions
that possessed durability-enhancing characteristics, such as constitutional amendments (Crain &
Tollison, 1979a), the executive veto (Crain & Tollison, 1979b), and the size of legislative majorities
(Crain et al., 1988).5
While these mechanisms can reduce the probability that future politicians will renege on the
bargains reached between interest groups and politicians today, there is no guarantee that they
will always be effective. What recourse do interest groups have if these mechanisms fail? One
answer is that they simply incur the loss. But this answer is unsatisfying for two reasons. First, it
is not unreasonable to think that interest groups would demand assurances from the legislature
that they will be compensated should their legislatively-created benefits be terminated, especially
given the transitional losses that such a termination would entail (Tullock, 1975). The second,
and in my view, more compelling reason is that if politicians could devise a mechanism that
indemnifies interest groups for the loss ex post, they could charge a higher price for legislation
3These mechanisms also increase the costs of enacting legislation in the first place. Nonetheless, if the benefits
from increased durability exceed the additional costs of enacting legislation, the net value of legislation will be
increasing. Thus, politicians will adopt durability-enhancing mechanisms up to the point where the marginal value
of additional durability is just offset by the costs associated with enacting new legislation. See also: Crain (1977)
and Shepsle & Weingast (1981).
4For an analysis of the incentives of judges to enforce wealth transfers, see Anderson et al. (1989) and Toma
(1991).
5See Shughart & Tollison (1998) for a survey of this literature.
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ex ante.6
Scholars working on the rise of agency finance have identified a number of mechanisms
through which regulatory agencies, and the executive branch more broadly have been able
to raise and allocate revenue independent of Congress. This paper considers one of these
mechanisms: the Department of Justice’s settlement authority. I argue that the broad discretion
the Department of Justice has over the terms of the settlements reached between itself and
private organizations enables it to extract substantial amounts of financial resources that it can
then direct to politically-important groups, including those whose legislatively-created benefits
have been terminated.7
As others have noted, data on both the sources and recipients of the funds allocated by the
executive branch are difficult to find, which is itself telling. That said, two recent settlements
involving Citigroup and Bank of America are illustrative of the sort of behavior I describe in this
paper. These settlements are notable not only because they involved the allocation of money
to third-party groups who were not directly harmed by the alleged violations of federal law, but
because both corporations were required to donate millions of dollars to housing counseling
organizations whose subsidies Congress reduced following the 2010 midterm elections.
This paper also contributes to a growing literature on the notion of “political capitalism”
(Holcombe, 2018a). In this framework, the state’s role in the economy is not limited to establish-
ing and enforcing the “rules of the game.” Instead, the state is actively involved in the allocation
of wealth across the economic and political elite. This literature focuses on the institutions
that facilitate rent seeking and extraction rather than on these activities themselves. Holcombe
(2017), for example, argues that both politicians and interest groups have an incentive to limit
competition for politically created rents in order to prevent dissipation. In a similar vein, Hol-
combe (2018b) argues that policies that create transitional-gains traps are in fact not mistakes
6See Goldberg (1976) for a discussion of the role of insurance contracts in reducing post-contractual oppor-
tunism in private transactions.
7Verret (2010) uses a similar “rent-transfer” approach wherein the government extracts rents from one group
and transfers them to another. In his framework, the government uses its equity power to extract politically-created
rents from rescued firms that are then transferred to politically-important interest groups. See also: Appelbaum &
Katz (1987).
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because they enable politicians to engage in rent extraction that would otherwise be infeasible.
This paper takes a similar approach by focusing on the incentives that politicians have to devise
institutional mechanisms that facilitate political exchange.
Finally, this paper contributes to the “political Coase theorem" literature (Acemoglu, 2003;
Munger, 2018; Parisi, 2003). The debate in this literature centers around whether it is possi-
ble to bargain away from inefficient institutions in the sense described by Coase (1960) when
credible commitments are impossible. I argue that mechanisms like the Department of Justice’s
settlement authority can be used to compensate interest groups on the losing side of a change in
the status quo, thereby facilitating reform. Moreover, I argue that politicians have an incentive
to create such mechanisms because they raise the value of legislative outputs, and with it the
price that politicians can charge for special-interest legislation.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss the problem
of durability and show that an insurance mechanism that indemnifies interest groups on the
losing side of changes to the status quo can increase the value of special-interest legislation
ex ante. Section 3 provides an overview of the Department of Justice’s settlement authority,
illustrating how it is particularly well-suited to providing the sort of indemnification mechanism
that I discuss in Section 2. Following this overview, I present evidence from recent settlements
that is consistent with the theory in Section 4. The final section concludes.
2 Increasing the Durability of Politically-Created Rents
2.1 The Problem of Durability
In the interest-group theory of government, the majority of the state’s activities involve trans-
ferring resources among the citizenry (McCormick & Tollison, 1981). Wanting to avoid being
on the “losing” side of a transfer, the citizens have an incentive to organize in order to in-
fluence government policy in their favor. Some groups will be more effective in this regard,
8There is a parallel literature that applies these insights to the evolution of political institutions. See, for
example, Barzel (2000), McGuire & Olson (1996), and North & Weingast (1989).
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and it is this difference in effectiveness that gives rise to a market for special-interest legisla-
tion (Olson, 1971).9 Those groups that can organize to secure $1 for less than $1 will demand
politically-created wealth transfers, while those groups that cannot will supply them. The market
is brought into equilibrium by politicians who, acting as brokers, pair suppliers with demanders.
The fact that bargains reached between interest groups and politicians are not easily en-
forceable complicates this relationship. In private sales and contracts, legal sanctions exist to
ensure that each party honors their part of the bargain. The influence that these sanctions have
on economic activity depends on how quickly the parties execute the transaction and the extent
to which each party’s concern for their reputation induces them to act in good faith. The present
value of a stream of contracted benefits will be larger in the presence of such sanctions because
they reduce the possibility of post-contractual opportunism.10 Likewise, legal sanctions can
reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behavior as reputational constraints become less binding.
The lack of a mechanism to enforce special-interest legislation increases the likelihood of
post-contractual opportunism in political exchanges. Broadly speaking, such opportunism can
take two forms in a political context. The first occurs when a politician reneges on an agreement,
e.g., he accepts payment in exchange for a politically-created benefit and fails to honor his end
of the bargain. The second occurs when there is an unanticipated change in the makeup of
the legislature such that the politically-created benefit is no longer consistent with the political
equilibrium and is thus repealed (or never enacted). Interest groups, aware of this possibility,
discount the value of politically-created benefits. The more likely post-contractual opportunism
becomes the more interest groups will discount the value of a politically-created benefit.11
9See McCormick & Tollison (1981, 25-27) for a simple proof of the proposition that differential organization
costs are a necessary condition for politically-mediated wealth transfers to occur.
10Following Klein et al. (1978), I define post-contractual opportunism as unanticipated non-fulfillment of the
contract.







where xi is the dollar value of the benefit in period i, r is the interest rate, and ρi is the probability that the benefit
will be delivered as promised, i.e., 0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1. Here, ρ reflects the durability of a politically-created benefit (Note
that the probability that the benefit will be delivered as promised can change in each period). Thus, the present
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Political office confers a property right to the officeholder, the value of which is, among
other things, a function of the value of legislative outputs.12 In consequence, politicians have an
incentive to devise mechanisms that impart durability to politically-created benefits. One way
to do so is to build a reputation for honest dealing. This strategy is similar to that of firms
that make large investments in non-salvageable assets, such as brand-name capital, whose value
is contingent on contractual performance (Klein & Leffler, 1981). That said, while a reputation
for honest dealing is a necessary condition for increasing the durability of politically-created
benefits, it may not be sufficient. From the the interest group’s perspective, it may not be
easy to determine whether the politician has reneged on the deal or whether there has been a
shift in the political equilibrium such that producing the politically-created benefit is no longer
feasible. Consequently, a reputation for honest dealing must be supplemented with institutional
mechanisms that impart durability to politically-created benefits (Weingast & Marshall, 1988).
Setting aside the possibility of cheating, there is no guarantee that the stability of the leg-
islature is sufficient to ensure the durability of politically-created benefits. Even if the current-
period political equilibrium exhibits some degree of persistence into the future, competition
among special interest groups can cause it to evolve randomly over time such that it will be
impossible for both politicians and special interest groups to predict with certainty what the
political equilibrium will be in subsequent periods.13 Absent mechanisms that can ensure dura-
bility, this uncertainty reduces interest groups’ willingness to pay for politically-created benefits,
and with it the value of legislative outputs and politician’s political property rights.
value of a subsidy or a tariff, for example, is an increasing function of how long an interest group expects to receive
the benefit.
12See Crain & Tollison (1977) for analysis of the effects of term limits on the value of political property rights.
13By persistence I mean the extent to which the equilibrium generated by the political system in the current
period persists into the subsequent periods. For instance, let the equilibrium in the current period be given
by: zt = γzt−1 + εt, where 0 < γ < 1 and εt v N(0, σ2ε ). Here, γ measures the persistence of the political
equilibrium and εt captures the uncertainty faced politicians and interest groups with respect to the state of the
political equilibrium. As γ increases, so too does the persistence of the political equilibrium. On the other hand, as
σ2ε increases the political environment becomes increasingly unstable. Accordingly, the gains from implementing
durability-enhancing mechanisms will be greater when the political equilibrium exhibits less persistence and when
the political environment is less stable, all else equal.
6
2.2 A Model
In Figure 1, the demand curve, d0d1 reflects interest groups’ willingness to pay for politically-
created benefits under the assumption that the benefits will be limited to the term of the enacting
legislature. The demand curve is downward sloping because interest groups will demand more
of these benefits the lower is the price of acquiring them. The supply curve, S0S1, reflects
the marginal cost of producing the benefits.14 The market will clear at e1, with the legislature
producing Q1 units of special-interest legislation. The area bounded by d0e1S0 represents the












Figure 1: The Demand and Supply of Special-Interest Legislation
On the other hand, if bargains struck between interest groups and politicians were perfectly
durable, the increased value of politically created benefits would cause the demand curve to
shift up and to the right. The demand curve D0d1 reflects such a shift. Assuming that perfect
14The assumption of constant marginal cost does not affect the analysis in this paper. Its purpose is to simply
the geometric analysis.
15The precise distribution of the surplus is not relevant to the analysis in this paper. I assume only that the
value of an office holder’s political property right is proportional to the size of the surplus.
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durability could be achieved without incurring additional costs, the market would clear at e2,
with the legislature producing Q2 units of special-interest legislation. Note that the increased
durability increases the size of the surplus from d0e1S0 to D0e2S0. The greater surplus implies
an increase in the present value of a politician’s political property rights. Thus, politicians have
an incentive to devise mechanisms that increase the durability of the deals reached with interest
groups; the larger this surplus is the more both groups will benefit from the transaction.
Of course, increasing the durability of special-interest legislation isn’t costless nor can
durability-enhancing mechanisms be expected to work perfectly. Consequently, the relevant
demand and supply curves are D1d1 and S2S3, respectively. The market will clear at e3, with
the legislature producing Q3 units of special-interest legislation. Note that despite these shifts
in the demand and supply curves the size of the surplus, D1e3S2, is still larger than what it
would otherwise be if there was a total lack of durability. Accordingly, politicians will pursue
durability-enhancing mechanisms up to the point where the increase in interest groups’ will-
ingness to pay for special-interest legislation is just offset by the costs of producing additional
durability. In other words, politicians have an incentive to push the market towards D0d1 as
long as the dollar value of the surplus is increasing.
To make this point more concrete let’s consider a simple model that illustrates how the
present value of special-interest legislation would be affected by the existence of an insurance
mechanism that paid out when that legislation was repealed. To keep the math simple and
intuitive, assume that an interest group - a firm, an industry, whatever - was receiving a dollar’s
worth of benefits from a legislated benefit. This could take the form of an entry restriction, a
tariff, or even a direct subsidy. Now, in the case of perfect durability, the present value of a
dollar’s worth of benefits in perpetuity is simply equal to $1/r, where r is the interest rate.
Now, as I have already discussed its unlikely that politically-created benefit could be sus-
tained indefinitely, if for no other reason than technological change will cause the political
equilibrium to shift in ways that make the original bargains unsustainable. How does this affect
the present value of a dollar’s worth of politically-created benefits? The simple answer is that
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this income stream needs to be discounted to reflect the probability that the benefit will be
received in the future (in addition to the standard present value discounting). It also seems
reasonable to think that this probability will not be constant across time, with future periods
having a reduced probability that the benefit will continue to be sustained. Thus, we need a
function that reflects this change. One such function could be:







), 0 < p < 1 (1)













), 0 < γ < 1 (2)
Provided that γ > 0, a mechanism that insures politically-created rents raises the present value
of special-interest legislation.
What we have here is function whose value is decreasing as time passes. Now, durability
enhancing mechanisms that reduce the probability reduce p, thus raising the present value of
special-interest legislation and the price that politicians can charge for it. Note, however, that
for any given degree of durability, the value of the politically-created benefit is decreasing over
time. It just so happens to be the case that this value deteriorates at a slower rate the higher p
is. The probability that the special interest legislation will be eliminated is (1 − p). Obviously,
absent an insurance mechanism the interest group on the losing side of reform will receive
nothing such that the present value of the politically-created benefit is determined entirely by
equation (1).
Now, let’s introduce an insurance mechanism that pays out in the event that the politically-
created benefit is terminated. Before proceeding, however, a few qualifications are in order.
First, there is no guarantee that such an insurance mechanism will work, so it isn’t sufficient to
discount the lump sum payout using (1− p). Second, I just realized that I haven’t discussed the
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lump sum payout. One way to think about this mechanism working is that when the benefit is
terminated, the interest group on the losing side of reform receives a lump sum payout equal to
the present value of the remaining income stream. However, as I said, receiving such a payout
isn’t guaranteed, so the value needs to be discounted by the probability that the insurance
mechanism actually works. Let’s denote that probability γ.














As time progresses, the probability that the legislation will be repealed increases, which
causes the remaining payment stream to decline. If the benefit is repealed, there is some
probability, γ that the interest group will receive a lump-sum payout equal to the value of that
payment stream. What this means is that we have the probability of repeal, times the probability
that the insurance mechanism works, times the present value of the remaining payment stream.
It is quite obvious from equation (2) that the present value of special-interest legislation
is higher with the insurance mechanism than without it. How much higher? Table 1 shows
the present value of a dollar’s worth of politically-created benefits under different assumptions
about the model’s parameters. It is quite clear that the mere existence of such a mechanism,
even at low probabilities of being used to indemnify interest groups on the losing side of reform,
increases the present value of legislative bargains considerably. In other words, it doesn’t take
much for such a mechanism to have a positive effect on the value of special-interest legislation.
This logic reflects the intuition expressed in Figure 1. Increase durability raises the value
of special-interest legislation, and with it the value of legislative outputs. Since the value of
a politician’s political property right depends positively on the value of legislative outputs, an
insurance mechanism of the sort described in this section will raise the value of legislative
outputs, and with it the value of a politicians political property right. Assuming that politicians’
objective is to maximize the value of their political property right, my analysis indicates that
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they have a strong incentive to identify and implement such mechanisms.
A note on the idea of maximizing the present value of one’s political property right. Whether
or not that’s what politicians consciously try to do or not is irrelevant. To understand why this
point is not germane to my analysis, one must keep in mind that political office is a scarce
resource and as such is subject to competition. Over time, these competitive pressures weed out
those politicians that fail to maximize the value of their political property rights and rewards
those who do by ensuring re-election.
I want to be crystal clear on how this insurance mechanism works. In some future period
the political system eliminates the special interest legislation, terminating the payment stream
the interest group expected to receive. The present value of this loss is equal to the probability-
weighted amount the group expected to receive in each subsequent period, discounted back to
the present.
2.3 Insuring Politically-Created Benefits
One of the primary implications of the previous section is that politicians have an incentive
to implement durability-enhancing mechanisms up to the point where the increased costs of
doing so are just offset by interest groups’ willingness to pay for legislation. In this section,
I derive a simple theory of how an insurance-like mechanism that indemnifies interest groups
on the losing side of changes to the status quo could aid in addressing the durability problem.
Assuming that such a mechanism was credible, and if it could be implemented at a sufficiently
low cost, a mechanism that compensates interest groups whose legislatively-created benefits
have been terminated would raise these groups’ willingness to pay for politically-created rents
and with it the value of politicians’ political property rights.
Durability-enhancing mechanisms are of essentially two types. The first are automatic; they
impart durability via the structure of the government and its subsidiary institutions, e.g. the
separation of powers, bicameralism, etc. These mechanisms increase the durability of special-
interest legislation by increasing the procedural costs that must be incurred if the legislature
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wants to repeal legislation. The second type require active use by other parties, e.g., judges, the
executive, etc. The trouble with implementing an insurance-like mechanism that indemnifies
interest groups whose legislatively-created benefits have been terminated is that, at least in the
Untied States, the legislature has authority over the raising and allocation of the government’s
revenue.
Consider a case where the the automatic mechanisms have failed; it seems reasonable to
conclude that the political equilibrium is such that the current legislature would be unwilling
to compensate interest groups on the losing side of the realignment. In order for such a
mechanism to be credible, it must be capable of circumventing the legislature’s appropriations
power; otherwise, the mechanism would have no effect on the demand for special-interest
legislation. In other words, the organization responsible for indemnifying those groups harmed
by the reform must be sufficiently independent from the legislature or it will be ineffective.16
One way to achieve this degree of independence would be for the legislature to empower the
executive branch with the ability to raise and allocate revenue without the legislature’s approval
such that the organization responsible for implementing it is largely free of interference from
the legislature - at least at the time when the decision is made to indemnify the interest group
or groups on the losing side of reform.17 In other words, the legislature would need to delegate
a part of its appropriation power to another branch of government to ensure that when its
preferences change such that the original bargain between it and the interest group or groups
is no longer sustainable there is an external organization that can compensate those whose
legislatively-created benefits have been terminated.
To see how such a process could work, consider the following scenario. First, there is a
change in the makeup of the legislature whereby the party that was in the majority is now in
the minority - either in one or both chambers of the legislature. This shift, in turn, may mean
16This point is similar to that emphasized by Landes & Posner (1975); if the independent judiciary is going to
act as an effective enforcement mechanism it must be sufficiently independent of Congress otherwise it would have
no effect on interest groups’ willingness to pay for legislation.
17I abstract away from issues related to how it is that the legislature controls this organization. In the final
section of the paper, I discuss possible mechanisms that the legislature could use to ensure that the responsible
organization acts in a manner that is consistent with maximizing the value of politicians’ political property rights.
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that bargains struck in the past may no longer be consistent with the political equilibrium,
e.g., it may no longer be possible to produce benefits - tariffs, subsidies, or entry regulations
- for particular interest groups. The groups on the losing end of the realignment are likely to
be constituents of the now-minority party. If the President was a member of the same party
as the new majority, it is unlikely that the minority party in Congress could count on him to
compensate the losing parties. On the other hand, if the President was a member of the minority
party he may be willing to provide compensation to those whose legislatively-created benefits
have been terminated, provided that they are an important constituency to him as well.
The foregoing discussion suggests the following refutable implications. First, this mechanism
will be more likely to be used following a change in the makeup of the legislature such that the
party that was in the majority is now in the minority in at least one of the two chambers of the
legislature. Second, this mechanism will be more likely be used when the President is a member
of the same party as that which is in the minority in the legislature. Third, the recipients of
funds via this indemnification mechanism will be groups whose legislatively-created benefits
have been terminated following the realignment in the legislature. Finally, these recipients will
be constituents of the now-minority party, but their importance will not be limited to a particular
Congressional district or state.
3 The Department of Justice’s The Settlement Authority
3.1 A Brief History
The Department of Justice’s settlement authority derives from its role as litigator on behalf of
the United States government. Congress formally established this authority when it created the
Department of Justice in 1870 to centralize decision making regarding litigated cases within the
Executive Branch (Peterson, 2009, pp. 343). Under this authority, the Department of Justice
can settle cases with those it suspects of violating federal law with little-to-no oversight from
the other branches of government (Peterson, 2009, pp. 370-373). Indeed, the broad discretion
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and limited oversight that the Department of Justice has over the terms of the settlements into
which it enters allow it to extract substantial amounts of financial resources from firms and
other organizations that it can then allocate to politically-important groups.
The broad discretion that the Department of Justice has over the terms of the settlements
it negotiates allows it to sidestep Congress’ appropriations power by requiring the violator of
federal law to undertake certain actions that can have fiscal implications (Peterson, 2009, pp.
347-348). For example, the Department of Justice might require the violator to undertake an
activity that would otherwise be performed by an executive agency, freeing up resources for
other projects. Alternatively, the terms of the settlement might direct the violator to donate
money to third-parties in lieu of a transfer payment that the recipient would have otherwise
received from an executive agency.
These examples are not just hypothetical. Violators of environmental statues such as the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts have been required to perform Supplemental Environmental
Projects as part of their settlement agreements with the Department of Justice - projects that
would otherwise have to be funded via appropriations from Congress (Peterson, 2009, pp. 351-
358). Similarly, the Department of Justice recently required Gibson Guitar to make monetary
donations to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation for violating the Lacey Act by importing
wood from Madagascar (Settlement Agreement between DOJ and Guibson Guitar Corp., 2012).
The settlement authority enables the executive branch to raise revenue independent of the
legislature and allocate it without their direction. This authority is a “creature of Congress,”
however. Legislators could curtail this authority and yet they have not, which suggests that
they may benefit from the arrangement. The analysis in the previous sections suggests that
one of the ways that politicians could benefit from this arrangement is by using the settlement
authority as an insurance-like mechanism that compensates interest groups if their politically-
created benefits have been terminated. To illustrate how this mechanism works, I examine
evidence from two recent settlements between the Department of Justice and Bank of America
and Citigroup.
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3.2 Transferring Rents by Extracting Rents
In order to analyze how these settlements, it will be useful to develop a simple framework to
analyze the relationship between the Department of Justice and the alleged violators of fed-
eral statues. The basis of this framework is McChesney’s (1987; 1991) model of rent extraction
wherein politicians extract rents from organizations by threatening to impose even greater costs
on them if they fail to comply. This framework differs from the standard interest-group ap-
proach to wealth transfers in that the suppliers of the wealth transfers are small, potentially well
organized groups rather than large ones. In other words, being a small, well-organized interest
group can cut both ways - it improves the group’s ability to secure politically-created benefits,
but it also lowers the costs that politicians must incur to confiscate the group’s surplus making
it more susceptible to rent extraction.
To be effective, rent extraction requires that the threat to impose costs be credible (Shavell,
1993). In other words, the threatened party must believe that the threat will be carried out
if, and only if, the demands are not met. If, for example, following through with the threat
is prohibitively costly, then there is little reason for the threatened party to acquiesce to the
demands. Alternatively, the person, or organization making the threat may simply enjoy carrying
out the threat regardless of what the threatened party does. Again, there is little reason for the
threatened party to acquiesce to the demands.
The key, therefore, to successful rent extraction is ensuring that complying with the demands
is the rational choice from the threatened party’s perspective. In the case of the settlement
authority, for example, the Department of Justice could offer the alleged violator a choice: pay
the settlement or go to court. As long as the terms of the settlements are less than the expected
costs of going to court it will be rational for the alleged violator to pay the settlement even if
they did not violate the statute.
The Department of Justice’s ability to extract rents and then allocate them enables the
executive branch to circumvent the legislature’s appropriations power. This mechanism does
not require Congress’ approval, nor are the settlements subject to much oversight by the Judicial
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system. In short, the settlement authority allows the executive branch to make fiscal policy with
little-to-no influence from the two other branches of government. As I argue in the subsequent
subsection, this authority can be used to indemnify interest groups whose legislatively-created
benefits have been terminated.
3.3 Evidence From Two Recent Settlements
Following the 2010 midterm elections, the Democrats went from being in the majority to the
minority in the United States’ House of Representatives.18 In 2011, the new Congress eliminated
the $88 million appropriation that the Department of Housing and Urban Development had
been receiving to fund its housing counseling assistance program, which provided funding for
Department of Housing and Urban Development-approved non-profit organizations. In 2012,
Congress restored $45 million for the program, leaving the funding for the program at 50%
of what it was prior to 2011. This level of funding remained consistent in 2014 and 2015
at $45 million and $47 million, respectively (Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016 , 2016).
Despite Congress restoring approximately half of the original $88 million, many of the recipient
organizations were displeased with the reduction in funding, including the National Urban
League, the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, and the National Neighborworks
association (Prior, 2011).
The first thing to note about this situation is that the election represented a shift in the
political equilibrium, and with it a change in the pattern of government spending. While
the Democrats remained in the majority in the Senate they lost their majority in the House
of Representatives. This shift was such that the durability-enhancing mechanisms failed to
prevent the termination of the politically-created benefit, which means that if the recipients of
the appropriation were going to receive compensation for the loss it would need to come from
outside the legislature. In this case, the President was a member of the now-minority party in
the House of Representatives, which means that it would be potentially feasible for the executive
18Prior to that point the Democrats had a majority in both chambers of Congress since 2006. Moreover, they
also had the Presidency following the election of Barack Obama in 2008.
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branch to indemnify these groups. In terms of the theory derived in the previous section, the
conditions sufficient for the use of the type of indemnification mechanism had been met.
In 2014, the Department of Justice reached settlements with a number of financial institutions
- including Bank of America and Citigroup - for their alleged misconduct in the period leading
up to the crisis. As Wilt (2017, pp. 258-259) notes, these financial institutions have strong
incentives to settle with the Department of Justice. For example, negative publicity can cause
a firm’s stock price to fall and a negative legal judgement may jeopardize its financial health.
Moreover, going to trial presents a serious risk that, all else the same, corporations would
probably prefer to avoid. Consequently, the possibility of settling with the Department of Justice
offers an attractive alternative. In other words, the conditions for effective rent extraction were
likely present.
Statutory authority to bring these claims against Citigroup and Bank of America, and to seek
financial restitution against these institutions, came from the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, which Congress passed after the savings and loan
crisis. Under this law, the Attorney General can pursue civil action against federally-insured
institutions that engage in fraudulent behavior. An additional feature of this law is that the
burden of proof that must be established to impose financial penalties is lower than in a criminal
trial. The Attorney General need only show that a preponderance of the evidence indicates that
the charged institution is guilty. In the context of rent extraction, this reduced burden of proof
has important implications for the credibility of the threat. By weakening the evidentiary burden
that must be established to find the firm guilty, the law makes compliance more likely. The
Department of Justice used this law to pursue civil action against the aforementioned banks, and
to seek financial restitution for their actions, which the Department of Justice argued included
defrauding their customers, investors, and the government (Settlement Agreement between DOJ
and Bank of America, 2014; Settlement Agreement between DOJ and Citi, 2014).
While the terms of each settlement are highly detailed and complex, the agreements with
Bank of American and Citigroup are notable for several reasons. First, the settlements required
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each firm to make donations to the same non-profit organizations whose funding had been
reduced by Congress two years earlier. The settlement with Bank of America required at
least $20 million in donations to Department of Housing and Urban Development-approved
organizations, and the settlement with Citigroup required at least $10 million in donations.
Second, not only were these firms required to make donations to the organizations whose
funding had been terminated by Congress, the Department of Justice incentivized them to do
so by offering a $2 credit for every $1 donated.
As of 2016, Bank of America and Citigroup have received a credit of $46 million and $23
million, respectively, for their donations to approved organizations. The available data does
not clearly delineate between money actually donated by each firm and the credits they have
received from the Department of Justice from doing so. Assuming that both firms are receiving
the two-to-one credit then as of 2016, the approved organizations have received combined
donations of $34.5 million (Wilt, 2017, p. 270). Between the $47 million approved by Congress
in 2015 and these settlements, funding for the housing assistance counseling program totaled
$81.5 million - $6.5 million shy of its pre-2011 amount.
These settlements essentially counteracted Congress’ decision to reduce the amount of
money allocated for the housing counseling assistance program. Moreover, the recipients of
the settlement funds were also constituents of the the Democrat’s and Obama administration’s
coalition such as the National Community Reinvestment Coalition and the National Council
of La Raza, both of whom have received a total of $6.05 million and $3.5 million from the
settlements, respectively Wilt (2017).
While certainly not conclusive, the evidence provided in this section is consistent with the
theory presented in the previous section. The Department of Justice’s settlement authority en-
abled it to collect revenue independent of Congress, which, in consultation with the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, it then allocated to groups whose funding had been re-
duced following a shift in the makeup of the legislature. Although the Department of Justice
retained no control over the use of money donated to third-party organizations, it did control
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which organizations are eligible for donations by relying on the Department of Housing and
Urban Development to determine the eligibility requirements.
4 Conclusion
Like private markets, interest group politics requires certain institutional mechanisms to function
- a fact that economists working within the public choice and law and economics traditions
have long recognized. To date, however, their focus has been on mechanisms that raise the cost
of repealing politically-created benefits rather than on mechanisms that compensate interest
groups who are on the losing side of changes to the status quo. In this paper, I have shown how
politicians can benefit from mechanisms that compensate interest groups whose legislatively-
created benefits have been terminated. To illustrate how this process works, I examined two
recent settlements wherein the Department of Justice used its settlement authority to extract
substantial financial resources from Citigroup and Bank of American and then reallocated those
resources to housing counseling assistance organizations whose funding had been reduced by
Congress following the 2010 midterm election. Still though, more work remains to be done on
this important topic.
While the evidence I presented in this paper is consistent with the theoretical justification
I provided for an insurance-like mechanism, additional case studies and quantitative work will
be necessary to determine the extent to which mechanisms like the settlement authority are
used to compensate interest groups on the losing side of changes to the status quo. Moreover,
future research should attempt to identify other, similar mechanisms. The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, for example, has a settlement authority similar to that of the Department of
Justice and is likewise insulated from interference from Congress. Whether it has been used in
a manner similar to that described in this paper remains an open question.
One of the important issues that I have not addressed is how Congress ensures that De-
partment of Justice officials use the settlement authority the manner I have described in this
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paper. Here, I can offer three conjectures that should be explored in future research. The first
is that Congress controls the Department of Justice via its budget, e.g., Congress rewards the
Department of Justice for acting in a manner consistent with its wishes. The second is similar
to the first; Congress controls the scope of the Department of Justice’s power via changes to its
statutory authority. The final conjecture is that insofar as the interests of the current adminis-
tration and the minority party in Congress are aligned, as they are in the theory developed in
this paper, then such control may be unnecessary.
In addition, my analysis of the settlement authority has been confined to what Peterson
(2009, p. 347) has called the “augmentation problem,” by which he means the ability of federal
agencies to augment their budgets independent of Congress by requiring alleged violators of
federal statutes to either undertake projects or transfer financial resources to third parties that
would otherwise need to be funded by the agencies themselves. This channel is not the only
way that the settlement authority can be used, however. Congress has not only given the De-
partment of Justice the authority to settle cases brought against the United States, it has also
created a permanent, indefinite appropriation known as the Judgement Fund that the Depart-
ment of Justice can use to pay settlements against the United States. As Peterson notes (2009,
p. 348), this “unauthorized grant problem” allows the Department of Justice to settle with
politically-important plaintiffs independent of the legal merit of the plaintiffs’ claims. Future
research should examine the recipients of such settlements to determine whether the pattern of
disbursements is consistent with the theory presented in this paper.
This paper has two important implications for the interest-group theory of government.
First, I have identified an additional role for the executive branch beyond the veto, which while
effective in terms of imparting durability to special-interest legislation, is a blunt instrument.
By contrast, the settlement authority enables the executive branch to direct targeted benefits
to politically-important interest groups thus making it a more precise mechanism for assuring
interest groups that they will be compensated if their politically-created benefits are terminated.
A second, and perhaps counter-intuitive implication of this paper is that mechanisms like
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the settlement authority may improve economic efficiency. Absent a mechanism to compensate
those who are currently benefiting from the status quo, interest groups on the losing side of a
policy reform may invest significant resources towards preventing the reform from occurring.
This outcome can be avoided by paying the “losers” the present value of their politically-
created benefits out of the surplus generated by the policy reform, which avoids wasteful efforts
to preserve the status quo.19 In this sense, the settlement authority can be seen as an efficient
response to the transaction costs that would otherwise need to be incurred if the “winning”
coalition was to pay off the “losing” one. If the settlement authority acts in the manner described
in this paper, then efforts to limit these types of transfers may be welfare reducing as interest
groups and politicians are forced to adjust along other, less efficient margins to increase the
durability of the bargains they reach.
Following the 2016 election wherein the Republicans retained control of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate in addition to winning the Presidency, the use of the settlement
authority in this manner was ended by then-Attorney General Sessions (Attorney General Jeff
Sessions Ends Third Party Settlement Practice, 2017). This development comports with the theory
offered here; the interests of the executive branch and the minority party in Congress were no
longer aligned. Whether this mechanism will be used in a similar manner following the 2018
election remains to be seen.
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